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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the interactions among oligarchs, political parties, 
and voters using an agent-based modeling approach. We introduce the OLIGO 
model, which is based on the spatial model of democracy, where voters have po-
sitions in a policy space and vote for the party that appears closest to them, and 
parties move in policy space to seek more votes. We extend the existing litera-
ture on agent-based models of political economy in the following manner: (1) by 
introducing a new class of agents – oligarchs – that represent leaders of firms in 
a common industry who lobby for beneficial subsidies through campaign dona-
tions; and (2) by investigating the effects of ideological preferences of the oli-
garchs on legislative action. We test hypotheses from the literature in political 
economics on the behavior of oligarchs and political parties as they interact, un-
der conditions of imperfect information and bounded rationality. Our key results 
indicate that (1) oligarchs tend to donate less to political campaigns when the 
parties are more resistant to changing their policies, or when voters are more in-
formed; and (2) if Oligarchs donate to parties based on a combination of ideolog-
ical and profit motivations, Oligarchs will tend to donate at a lower equilibrium 
level, due to the influence of lost profits. We validate these outcomes via compar-
isons to real world polling data on changes in party support over time.  
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Oligarchs are defined in the political economics literature as leaders of firms in a 
common industry that has barriers to entry (Stigler 1964; Acemoglu 2008). The 
term oligarch refers to a broad class of individuals – broadly speaking, members 
of "interest groups" (Downs 1957) or "pressure groups" (Rubin 1975) for leaders 
of firms in an industry with barriers to entry, which lobby the government for legis-
lative action to favor their common interest. Examples of oligarchs include "eco-
nomic groups," such as industries and corporations (Stigler 1971), and "privi-
leged groups" of individuals with a common interest, such as trade associations 
(Olson 1965). Oligarchs in an industry may tacitly collude, without directly com-
municating with each other, seeking to “capture” legislation that benefits them 
(Stigler 1964).  
 Pressure groups may be able to capture legislation through their influence, 
even in cases where the legislation benefits the oligarchs but has a cost to the 
rest of society (Stigler 1971). Special interest groups can obtain benefits, at a 
cost to the voters, because: (1) voters have imperfect information about politics 
and may not know the special interest benefits exist; and (2) political parties are 
willing to risk alienating voters by favoring special interests, if the parties are re-
warded with campaign contributions that make up for the votes lost (Rubin 1975; 
Stigler 1971).  
 Empirical research shows that oligarch spending influences political out-
comes in the US. Gilens and Page (2014) found that economic elites and busi-
ness-oriented interest groups both had independent influences on policy out-
comes, but the median voter did not. In a related study, Baumgartner, Berry, Ho-
jnacki, Leech, and Kimball (2009) concluded that trade associations (e.g., the 
American Petroleum Institute) and corporations are more likely to mobilize effec-
tively on an issue of particular interest to them than mass-based interest groups 
(e.g., labor unions, American Association of Retired Persons). Based on these 
studies, Gilens and Page (2014) have fittingly claimed that American democracy 
is subject to "economic elite domination" and "biased pluralism," where biased 
pluralism means that business-oriented interest groups have a disproportionately 
large effect on policy outcomes. 
 In this paper, we investigate the interactions among oligarchs, political 
parties, and voters using an agent-based modeling approach. We introduce the 
OLIGO model, which is based on the spatial model of democracy (Kollman, Mil-
ler, & Page 1992; Laver 2005), where voters have positions in a policy space and 
vote for the party that appears closest to them, and parties move in policy space 
to seek more votes. We extend previous work by Laver in the following manner: 
(1) by introducing a new class of agents—oligarchs—that represent leaders of 
firms in a common industry who lobby for beneficial subsidies through campaign 
donations; and (2) by investigating the effects of ideological preferences of the 
oligarchs on legislative action. 
In doing so, we extend the literature by contributing a new model of spe-
cial interest groups’ campaign donations that combines elements from agent-
based models of voter-party interaction (Kollman, Miller, & Page 1992; Laver 
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2005), with elements from economic models of special interest group behavior 
(Rubin 1975; Bardhan & Mookherjee 2000). We verify the model's correctness 
with a series of basic hypothesis tests, such as to show that Parties in our model 
adopt a mean ideological position near the center of policy space. Furthermore, 
we validate the model's fit to real world data by comparing changes over time in 
Party support in our model with 10 years of nationwide polling data on party sup-
port in the US. We also provide results from novel simulation experiments where 
oligarchs have ideological preferences, and show that oligarchs have a lower 
equilibrium level of political action and influence, when they allow ideological ra-
ther than profit motivations to guide their campaign donations. That is, if oligarchs 
choose which party to support based on ideological goals instead of expected 
profits, and adjust their donation levels based strictly on subsequent profits, then 
equilibrium donation levels will be lower. 
Our work accomplishes the following goals: (1) We show that the simple 
rules agents follow in our model are sufficient to capture much of the complex 
dynamics of this politico-economic system; (2) we verify and validate the results 
from prior studies that used analytic methods, using an alternative, agent-based 
modeling method; (3) we propose a novel finding regarding the nature of the 
equilibrium state of campaign donations of oligarchs with ideological preferences; 
and (4) we derive support for the claim that the OLIGO model is a useful test en-
vironment for novel hypotheses about oligarchs’ campaign donation behavior. 
 
Politico-Economic Models and Agent-Based 
Models (ABMs) 
 
Prior work on Politico-Economic Models using ABM 
 Political scientists have studied oligarch behavior, or special interest group 
behavior in general, through building "politico-economic models" (Frey & Schnei-
der 1975). The economic theory of politics provides a theoretical foundation for 
these models, in the idea that politics can be understood as a competition for in-
fluence among agents who seek to increase their own individual utilities. In a po-
litico-economic model, parties compete for votes, and special interest groups 
seek to increase profits by competing for political influence and beneficial legisla-
tion. During a run cycle of a typical politico-economic model, a "popularity func-
tion" executes, where voters vote for the party with the most favorable policy po-
sition, and a "reaction function" executes, where parties change their policy posi-
tions to seek more votes in the next cycle (Frey & Schneider 1975). Examples of 
such models include Rubin (1975), Aumann and Kurz (1977), and Brock and 
Magee (1978). 
 More recently, Grossman and Helpman (1996) presented a model where 
two political parties compete for votes in a policy space with two issue dimen-
sions. In this model, some voters are “informed” and others are “uninformed,” 
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where informed voters have more accurate knowledge about parties’ positions in 
policy space and are less susceptible to campaign advertising. Bardhan and 
Mookherjee (2000) developed a model that is especially similar to the model we 
will present here, although Bardhan and Mookherjee’s model is analytic rather 
than agent-based. Bardhan and Mookherjee’s model has two political parties 
competing for votes in an environment with one lobby group and voters who are 
either informed or uninformed. Informed voters vote for the party that maximizes 
their utility, while uninformed voters vote for whichever party spends more on 
campaigning. 
 The dynamics among oligarchs, voters, and political parties make up a 
complex, emergent system, where aggregate outcomes, such as the mean tax 
rate over time, emerge from interactions between individual agents. For example, 
parties do not follow any explicit rule that tells them to remain near the center of 
policy space or to favor oligarchs’ preferences, but these party behaviors emerge 
from the joint influence of voters and donors. Similarly, special interest group 
members are not compelled to donate more money to a political campaign when 
voters are more susceptible to advertising, but theorists contend that campaign 
donors do behave in this way (Grossman & Helpman 1996). A political party’s 
donation total emerges from influences like voters’ reactions to advertising and 
oligarchs’ tendency to free ride or to cooperate by making a donation. 
 A multi-agent-based model does not gloss over differences among agents 
that may affect their behavior, in order to derive an analytic equilibrium solution. 
Instead, it retains much of the complexity of the real world system, modeling out-
comes as samples from a stochastic process in which many distinct agents 
evolve over time. Therefore, such an approach may be preferable to differential 
equation-based approaches traditionally used by political economists (Bardhan & 
Mookherjee, 2000). Political economics models have several characteristics that 
make the agent-based approach especially useful. Agents in an economic model 
of politics are assumed to act in self-interest. Aggregate outcomes such as par-
ties moving toward the preferences of the median voter emerge from the interac-
tion of many self-interested agents, as in an agent-based model. Furthermore, 
agents in a voter-party model have incomplete information about the state of the 
system, such as what each party would do if in office, or what each voter would 
do if the parties changed policy positions. Agent-based models are appropriate 
tools for modeling complex systems such as this, where there is limited infor-
mation and bounded rationality. Finally, agent-based models are fully observable 
as they progress, so it is feasible to analyze their outcomes and changes over 
time in ways that may not be possible in analytic models. 
 Kollman, Miller, and Page (1992) presented a seminal agent-based model 
of interactions between voters and political parties. In this model (known as the 
KMP model), two parties compete for votes from a set of voters. Voters in the 
model know each party’s position in policy space and vote for the party that is 
closest to them.  Parties can change their positions in a discrete policy space 
with 15 dimensions and 7 possible values in each dimension. Parties seek either 
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to maximize votes or to maximize a function of votes and distance from a pre-
ferred policy position. The authors tested a variety of party strategies, to evaluate 
which strategies would allow parties to compete most effectively and maximize 
expected utility over time. Laver (2005) extended this work by developing a new 
agent-based model of voter-party interactions. In this model, the policy space has 
only two dimensions, so it is easier to visualize. Laver introduced a new strategy, 
called the Hunter strategy, which performs well in spite of its simplicity. In this 
strategy, a party moves again in the same direction across policy space as in the 
last cycle, if its votes increased; otherwise, the party chooses a different direction 
at random and moves that way. In this paper, we further extend this literature by 
introducing Oligarchs as a new class of computational agents, and by investigat-
ing the effects of ideological preferences of the oligarchs on legislative action.  
 
Key Definitional Issues 
 Before we proceed further, it is important to clarify some definitional issues 
regarding the following terms: Oligarch donations, taxes and the timescale repre-
sented by each run cycle in our models.  
 In our work, Oligarch "donations" need not be thought of as only repre-
senting campaign contributions in an election year. Donations can also represent 
any effort made by a business-oriented interest group (i.e., an Oligarch) to sup-
port a Party or win its favor, at a cost to the Oligarch.  
 The "tax" that distributes income from Voters to Oligarchs need not be 
thought of as a direct subsidy to Oligarchs and tax on Voters, but as any gov-
ernment policy that benefits Oligarchs financially at a cost to society. Stigler 
(1971) lists common examples such as a protective tariff, regulatory barriers to 
market entry for competitors, and price controls; Smith (2000) adds increased 
government spending in the oligarchs' industry and corporate tax exemptions; 
and Olson (1965) also notes lax regulatory policies as a favor to an industry that 
costs society something. Hence, it is plausible that the "tax rate" in our model 
may fluctuate more rapidly and widely than real tax rates typically do, because it 
represents the effect of particularistic policies that are apt to change rapidly. 
 Laver (2005) explained that his model does not depict election campaigns 
with its discrete time steps, but rather simulates continual change in party posi-
tions and voter intentions. Kollman, Miller, and Page (1992) specified that in their 
model, parties learn about voter intentions of how to vote through "test elections," 
or opinion polls, not only through election year results. The OLIGO model, as is 
typical in agent-based models of democracy, lets the most recent winning Party 
set the policy at each step, which in the context of continuous updating can be 
viewed as letting the Party with greater mandate in current Voter support set poli-
cy. To validate the rate at which party support changes over time in our model, 
we ran our model for 120 steps after the warm-up period and compared the 
change in party support at each cycle to data from 10 years of monthly opinion 
polls on US voter support for the Democratic and Republican parties, based on 
data from monthly Gallup polls collected from January 2004 to December 2013 
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(Gallup 2014). The Gallup poll asked voters if they are Democrats, Democrat 
leaning, Republicans, Republican leaning, or independent. It is important to note 
that given our goal of creating a model that can be validated by empirical data 
from the Gallup poll surveys, we directly adopted and implemented these cate-
gorical definitions in our model. We added the percentages for each category, to 
produce a time series of voters who would vote for each party. In constructing our 
time series of party support in this way, we assume that surveyed voters who 
support or lean toward a party would be more likely to vote for a candidate of that 
party, if an election were held immediately.   
Our results indicate that variations on our basic model called the Party-
Ideo-Motivated Model and the All-Ideo-Motivated Model match the polling results 
closely in terms of variance over time and central tendency, as will be shown in 
the results section. Although 1000 steps representing 1 month each represents 
83 years of real time, too long for our model to plausibly represent, this longer 
number of steps is helpful for steady state parameter estimation, and we will 
show that the behavior of our model over shorter intervals is consistent with 
trends in real world polling data. 
 
The OLIGO model 
In this section we present a description of the OLIGO model, based on the ODD 
(Overview, Design concepts, Details) protocol (Grimm et al. 2006). The OLIGO 
model is implemented in NetLogo (Wilensky 1999). The model’s source code can 
be found at http://www.openabm.org/model/3990/version/1/view. The description 
given here concerns our basic model, which we will refer to as the Ideo-
Indifferent Model (IIM) when necessary for clarification. Two variant models, the 
Party-Ideo-Motivated Model (PIMM) and All-Ideo-Motivated Model (AIMM), are 
introduced at the end of this section. 
 
Purpose 
To investigate how oligarchs (i.e., owners of firms in an industry with barriers to 
entry by new firms), could decide how much to invest in lobbying democratic par-
ties for subsidies, and how responsive parties might be to influence from the oli-
garchs' campaign donations, in light of politicians' goal of increasing their votes. 
 
Entities, state variables, and scales 
Our model contains three entity types: Oligarchs, Parties, and Voters. 5 Oli-
garchs, 2 Parties, and 100 Voters are created for each model run. These entity 
types interact as follows: Oligarchs donate money to the Party that advocates a 
higher redistributive tax in favor of the Oligarchs, and Oligarchs receive money 
from the tax enacted by the winning Party after each election. Parties receive 
votes from Voters and receive money in the form of campaign donations from 
Oligarchs. The incumbent Party sets the tax rate that redistributes money from 
Voters to Oligarchs. Voters give votes to the Party that appears closer to them in 
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policy space, based on their policy position, their salience along the olig and ideo 
axes, and the amount of campaign funding each Party has received. Voters give 
money to Oligarchs based on the tax rate. 
 All entities in the model are positioned in a policy space, which has two 
axes: the ideo axis, representing the ideological dimension of political belief, and 
the olig axis, which represents the special interests of Oligarchs. The level of the 
tax on Voters that funds the Oligarchs’ subsidy is determined by the incumbent 
Party’s position on the olig policy axis. Oligarchs donate money exclusively to the 
Party with higher olig position, and Voters all hold the minimum position along the 
olig axis. Voters are distributed along the ideo axis, in contrast, from a random 
normal distribution with mean at the center (0), and with a standard deviation of 
1/3 the radius of the space along that axis (Laver 2005). While the olig axis de-
termines the level of redistributive tax on Voters producing a subsidy to Oli-
garchs, the ideo axis represents the spectrum of Voter beliefs on other political 
issues. As such, the ideo axis may be thought of as the "principal component" of 
Voter beliefs that are "orthogonal to" beliefs about the desirable level of subsidy 
to Oligarchs. In the real world, this axis might represent the continuum of con-
servative to liberal views on social issues. 
 Oligarchs seek to increase profits, which represent the difference 
between their subsidy and the amount spent on campaign contributions. Their 
only available action is to increase or decrease their campaign contribution by a 
fixed step size. Each Oligarch has a gross-income constant representing the 
amount of money the Oligarch earns at each time step. An Oligarch has a dona-
tion-size variable indicating the fraction of its gross-income it can donate to the 
Party that proposes a higher redistributive tax. The effect of the party policy on 
the net income of oligarchs is represented as subsidy to oligarchs. The Oligarch 
can change its donation-size over time to adapt to its environment. Each Oligarch 
has a memory of the most recent subsidy it received, and uses this knowledge to 
decide whether to increase or decrease its donation-size proportionally. 
Note that in our model, the gross-income constant represents the oli-
garch's income before the effect of political policy (i.e., subsidies) and the oli-
garch's campaign donations. Allowing an oligarch's gross income, before subsidy 
and campaign donations, to vary based on factors such as incumbent party ideo 
position, would be an interesting extension to the model, but it is beyond the 
scope of the present work, given our focus on identifying the relationship be-
tween subsidies and the oligarch’s donation.  
 
 
Figure 1. Oligarch entity variables. 
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 Voters seek to minimize the distance of the incumbent Party from them-
selves along the ideo policy axis, and to decrease the tax they pay. Voters are 
modeled as reflex agents, which increase the salience they ascribe to the olig 
axis with greater probability when the tax rate is high. Voters have a position 
along the ideo policy axis. Voter positions along the ideo axis are initialized ran-
domly from a normal distribution. Voters have an olig-salience variable (Figure 2), 
which represents the relative salience a Voter ascribes to the olig policy axis, 
compared to the ideo policy axis. For example, a Voter with an olig-salience of 
1/3 will consider its distance from a Party along the olig axis to be only half as 
important as its distance from the Party along the ideo axis. A two-dimensional 
policy space with salience has been used in prior models, such as De Marchi 
(1999). Voters choose to vote for the Party that appears to be closer in policy 
space, based on the Party’s policy position, the Voter’s olig-salience value, and 
the level of campaign contributions the Party has received. The more campaign 
donations a Party receives from Oligarchs, the closer it will appear to each Voter, 
and the more likely it will be to win many votes. 
 
Figure 2. Voter entity variables. 
 
 Parties seek more votes, by changing their positions in policy space. Par-
ties have a position along the ideo and olig axes (Figure 3), and both of these 
positions are initialized randomly from a normal distribution with a standard de-
viation of 1/3 the radius of the policy space along its axes. Parties change their 
positions in policy space along each axis, at every time step, by a fixed step size 
in either direction. Parties have a memory of which way they moved at the last 
step, and of whether their vote totals increased or decreased, which they use to 
decide which way to move in the next step. 
 
Figure 3. Party entity variables. 
 
We tested model variations where OLIGARCH-GDP-FRACTION was set 
to 0.02 or 0.1 instead of to 0.05. Results for these model variations will be shown 
in the results section, as increasing Oligarch income relative to Voter income 
seems to increase the effect of Oligarchs' influence on political outcomes. The 
range of Oligarch incomes used in our study is comparable to real world revenue 
for major US industries and corporations relative to the total economy. That is, in 
2011 the total revenue of Fortune 500 companies was $10.8 trillion, while the top 
12 US-based oil companies had 2013 revenues of $1.4 trillion, and Apple Inc. 
had 2013 revenue of $170 billion. Major oil corporation revenue was thus about 
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13% of the Fortune 500 total in this period, and Apple Inc. revenue was about 
1.6% of the Fortune 500 total (Apple Inc. 2013; CNN Money 2013). So an 
OLIGARCH-GDP-FRACTION of 0.01-0.10 appears plausible as a representation 
of the revenue of a large corporation or industry. 
Voters have a VOTER-AD-DECAY-FACTOR which affects the extent to 
which there is a diminishing return from increased campaign donations. VOTER-
AWARENESS determines how likely a Voter is to increase its olig-salience value, 
when there are high tax rates. VOTER-MEMORY-STRENGTH determines how 
quickly a Voter’s olig-salience value decreases over time, when the Voter has not 
noticed high tax rates recently. And VOTER-MIN-DISTANCE-SCALE is the min-
imum fraction of the actual distance to a Party that a Voter can be made to per-
ceive as the true distance, when a Party has high campaign donations. 
 
 
Process overview and scheduling 
After Voter, Oligarch, and Party entities have been initialized, each run of the 
OLIGO model consists of 1300 cycles of the step procedure, of which only the 
last 1000 are analyzed. We discard the first 300 cycles of each run to remove the 
startup effect, or initial transient bias, that is present before the run reaches a 
steady state; this is sometimes called the replication-deletion approach to analyz-
ing the steady state of a system. We chose 300 cycles as the length of the dis-
carded warm-up period through Welch's graphical approach, as described in Law 
and Kelton (1991). That is, we plotted the mean profit (our output variable of in-
terest) across 100 independent runs, against the step number from 1 to 1300, 
and converted the plot to a moving average to smooth out noise. We then select-
ed 300 steps as the number that seemed by inspection to precede a steady state 
in the moving average graph. For comparison, Laver (2005) uses 150 cycles of 
warm-up and 250-1000 cycles per run. 
 At each step, the following events happen, in order: (1) Oligarchs update 
their donation-size values, and thus their campaign donations; (2) Voters vote for 
the Party that appears closer to them in policy space; (3) the elected Party sets 
the tax rate, and money is redistributed from Voters to Oligarchs; (4) Voters up-
date their olig-salience values; and (5) Parties update their positions in policy 
space (Figure 4). In each of these stages, entities perform their actions in a ran-
dom order, but the model is structured such that the order of agents’ actions is 
irrelevant within a given stage. One can think of the agents of any entity type as 
acting simultaneously. The sequence of stages in each run cycle is adapted from 
similar models in the literature, such as Grossman and Helpman (1996). 
 We use a run length of 1000 "steady state" cycles in our experiments, 
which may appear to be quite long. The benefit of long run duration is less noise 
in estimates of steady state model behavior, and this benefit may be why Laver 
(2005) also used runs of length up to 1000 cycles. As we discussed in an earlier 
section, similar to Laver (2005) and Kollman, Miller, and Page (1992), our model 
represents continuous adaptation of Parties and Voters between elections. Thus 
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a single run cycle may be viewed as the shortest interval in which parties can 
react by adjusting their policies to a perceived change in public support. For ex-
ample, an opinion polling cycle may be the closest real system equivalent to a 
run cycle, rather than an election cycle. 
  
 
Figure 4. Main module. Pseudocode for the submodels will be introduced below. 
 
Design concepts: Basic principles 
The OLIGO model fits into the class of “partial politico-economic models” (Frey & 
Schneider 1975), as it represents interactions between firms motivated by profit 
and political parties motivated by votes.  We model Voters and Parties with policy 
vectors in a two-dimensional space, where Voters vote for the Party that appears 
closer to them. As Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, and Nevitte (2001) pointed out, some 
theorists have suggested using a “directional model” where Voters vote for the 
Party whose position is furthest from center in the same direction as the Voter 
along each policy axis, but the “proximity model” described here is more preva-
lent and has been more strongly supported by prior studies. 
 The OLIGO model follows in the tradition of Downs (1957) by modeling 
utility seeking voters and vote seeking parties, but with bounded rationality and 
uncertainty leading to heuristic behavior rather than optimizing behavior. Downs' 
model includes interest groups as "favor buyers" who use campaign donations or 
other benefits to seek influence in party policies, which reflects the Oligarchs in 
our model. The number of Oligarch agents in our model is fixed over time, and 
the Oligarchs tacitly collude, without communicating with each other, to capture 
legislation in their benefit (Stigler 1964). Oligarchs are thus a "privileged group" in 
Mancur Olson's terms, as there are few enough of them and their interests are 
close enough that they are all likely to invest in helping the group politically, even 
without being compelled to (Olson 1965). We model this special interest legisla-
tion as a direct subsidy to the Oligarchs, paid for by the Voters, who are also the 
taxpayers (Stigler 1971; Becker 1983; Aumann & Kurz 1977). At each step of a 
model run, Oligarchs decide how much to donate to the campaign of the Party 
that proposes a higher redistributive tax in their favor (Rouchier & Thoyer 2006; 
Becker 1983). Oligarchs seek to increase their expected profit, which is the dif-
ference between the subsidy they expect to receive and the donation they make 
to a Party (Becker 1983). We assume that Oligarchs donate only to one Party, 
the Party that proposes a higher redistributive tax (Brock & Magee 1978; Rubin 
1975). 
 Oligarchs in our basic model, called the Ideo-Indifferent Model (IIM), and 
the Party-Ideo-Motivated Model variation (PIMM) have no preference over Party 
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positions on the ideo axis, so the Oligarchs' donations are based entirely on Par-
ty olig positions. Recall that the winning Party olig position determines the 
amount of the subsidy Oligarchs receive, so only the olig axis affects Oligarchs' 
profits. Thus, the Oligarchs' common business interests are modeled as orthogo-
nal to the ideological interests of Voters. We relax this assumption in the All-Ideo-
Motivated Model (AIMM), a variant of the model introduced below. But there is 
reason to model Oligarchs' political preferences as orthogonal to the core inter-
ests of Voters on the ideo axis. Smith (2000) notes that political action commit-
tees (PACs) generally seek "particularistic" policy change, not "unifying" policy 
change. That is, PACs seek policies that affect a narrow constituency and are not 
highly salient to most voters. PACs direct their funds mainly to issues that are 
"narrower, less visible" and lack a "mass opinion" of the public. These policies 
are not partisan but can be supported equally well by a conservative or liberal 
party. Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, and Kimball (2009) found that lobby 
groups' agendas were different from that of the general public, in that most is-
sues addressed by special interest lobbyists received little press coverage and 
were unknown to most voters. 
The political system in our model has two Parties that compete in a win-
ner-take-all election at every step of a run, where the winning Party sets the tax 
rate for all Voters (Bendor, Diermeier, & Ting 2003; Brock & Magee 1978; De 
Marchi 1999). Building on Laver (2005), parties in our model follow a “Hunter” 
strategy as they seek to increase votes. In a Hunter strategy, an agent will repeat 
its previous action if the agent received an improved payoff in the most recent run 
cycle; otherwise, the agent chooses an action that is somehow the opposite of its 
previous one. In our model, Parties will move in policy space in the same direc-
tion as they moved in the last step, if their votes increased; otherwise, they will 
move in a different direction. We model Parties as being influenced indirectly by 
donations from a special interest lobby, as suggested by Rouchier and Thoyer 
(2006) and by Stigler (1971). 
Voters in the OLIGO model vote for the closer Party in policy space, ad-
justed for the Voter’s salience value along each axis, and for the campaign dona-
tions each Party received. We use Voter salience differences along policy dimen-
sions to model the way Voters are generally ignorant about special interest legis-
lation unless they have been significantly harmed by that legislation, which may 
allow oligarchs in an industry group to capture a redistributive tax (Stigler 1971; 
Becker 1958; McKelvey & Ordeshook 1986; Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, 
Leech, & Kimball 2009). 
Following Stigler (1971), Voters in our model are more likely to increase 
the salience value they assign to the olig dimension, the higher the current tax 
rate. The tax assessed to a Voter can be seen as a message that has some 
probability of causing the Voter to increase its olig-salience, which is greater the 
higher the tax rate (Rubin 1975; Aidt 2000). When Voters do not receive the 
message that they are being taxed, their olig-salience levels decrease exponen-
tially along a forgetting curve, similar to the exponential forgetting model pr
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posed by Ebbinghaus (1913) and used recently in a political economics model by 
Aidt (2000).  
Muis (2010) created a model where a Party’s apparent distance from a 
Voter is reduced when the Party spends more on campaigning, up to a minimum 
fraction of the true distance. Our model combines all these approaches to ac-
count for the effects on Voter preferences of campaign spending and Voter sali-
ence along each policy dimension.  
To simplify our model, we assume that Voters do not make campaign do-
nations (Baron 1994). This reflects voters' status as a "large, latent group" (Ol-
son, 1965). Olson (1965) used this phrase to indicate that voters are so numer-
ous and diverse in their interests that they have little incentive individually to in-
vest in political influence. We further assume that Voters do not change their pol-
icy positions over time (Muis 2010; Laver 2005); that all Voters have the same 
gross-income (Becker 1983); and that Voters vote in every election (Dixit & 
Londregan 1996). 
We model Oligarchs, Voters, and Parties as myopic agents that seek to 
recover from a misstep that was punished in the previous cycle, or to repeat a 
reward that was earned in the previous cycle. The "win-stay-lose-shift" adaptive 
heuristic the agents follow is traditional in agent-based modeling and has been 
used in many other agent-based models of political behavior (Kollman, Miller, & 
Page 1992; Laver 2005). Even traditional non-agent-based models of political 
behavior assume that parties seek to maximize only present votes, not discount-
ed future votes (Downs 1957). Laver (2005) describes his agents as "adaptive 
agents" that "look backward and learn from the past" using heuristics, not "hyper-
rational agents" that "look forward strategically." This convention in political eco-
nomics models is justified by the realities of political systems, where political par-
ties are not perfectly rational or informed. Gilens and Page (2014) note that par-
ties lack the information and reasoning ability necessary to optimize their policies 
and maximize votes. Instead, parties must adapt to poll data using simple rules. 
Thus, it is reasonable for the OLIGO model to treat Party, Voter, and Oligarch 
behavior as myopic and adaptive rather than optimizing. 
 
Design concepts: Emergence 
The OLIGO model captures the emergent behavior of Party-Voter models such 
as Laver (2005) and Muis (2010). Parties in these models tend to stay near the 
median Voter’s position along the ideo policy axis, even though there is no rule 
specifying that they must do so. 
The OLIGO model introduces a new layer of complexity by adding Oli-
garch agents to the system. Party positions along the olig axis do not tend to 
align with the median Voter’s, but seem to be pulled toward the Oligarchs’ posi-
tion by campaign donations from the Oligarchs. Parties do not follow any rule that 
tells them to adjust their policy positions to seek donations. Parties seek only to 
increase votes, yet campaign donations indirectly lead Parties to promote Oli-
garchs’ interests. Moreover, Oligarchs’ donation levels emerge from the interac-
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tion among Oligarchs, Voters, and Parties, such that a change in the conditions 
of any agent type can alter the average level of Oligarch donations over time. 
 
Design concepts: Adaptation 
Voters in the OLIGO model adapt over time to prevent Parties from imposing too 
high a redistributive tax, while also preventing Parties from drifting too far from 
the center along the ideo policy axis. Voters adjust the relative importance of the 
olig and ideo policy dimensions by increasing their olig-salience value with a cer-
tain probability, which is greater when the tax rate is high, and otherwise allowing 
the olig-salience value to decay exponentially along a forgetting curve. 
 Parties adapt to changing olig-salience values among Voters, the chang-
ing position of their opposing Party, and changing donation tendencies among 
Oligarchs, by updating their positions in policy space. Parties follow a Hunter rule 
to decide how to update their policies in pursuit of votes. 
 Oligarchs adapt to changing Party positions, Party chances of winning 
election, Voter olig-salience values, and other Oligarchs’ donation sizes by updat-
ing their donation size. Oligarchs follow a Hunter strategy in pursuit of profit. 
 
Design concepts: Objectives 
Voters vote for the Party that seems to be closest to their position along the olig 
and ideo axes, adjusting for the relative importance of the two dimensions. Voters 
assign a relative salience value to the issue dimensions based on how strongly 
the voter has been affected by each issue recently. Each Oligarch aims to in-
crease net profit, which is its gross-income plus the amount it collects from a 
government subsidy, minus the amount it spends on lobbying. Each Party seeks 
to increase the votes it will receive in the next election. 
 
Design concepts: Learning 
During a model run, all three entity types learn effective strategies for their envi-
ronments. Voters learn a level of olig-salience that will protect them from high 
taxes while also making it likely that the incumbent Party will be near them along 
the ideo axis. Parties learn a policy position that will win many votes against most 
other positions. And Oligarchs learn a donation level that tends to increase their 
profit. 
 
Design concepts: Prediction 
Agents in the OLIGO model do not attempt to predict future outcomes. They 
merely repeat actions that have been beneficial in the past and avoid actions that 
have been harmful. 
 
Design concepts: Sensing 
Accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Journal	  of	  Artificial	  Societies	  and	  Social	  Simulations.	  
14	  
Voters in the OLIGO model can detect the location of each Party in policy space, 
but with a distortion effect that makes a Party appear closer to the Voter, the 
more campaign donations it received. Voters remember how much tax they paid 
in the previous run step. 
 Parties remember how many votes they received in the previous run step, 
but they do not know the other Party’s position, the positions of Voters, the dona-
tion policies of Oligarchs, or even their own positions. The Parties’ Hunter strate-
gy allows them to adapt to changing conditions even with limited knowledge of 
model state. 
 Oligarchs can detect which Party proposes a higher subsidy and the dif-
ference in the proposed subsidy between the two Parties. Oligarchs remember 
whether they increased or decreased their donation level in the previous run cy-
cle, and whether their profit increased or decreased. 
 
Design concepts: Interaction 
Voters in the model give votes to Parties, which influences the Parties’ behavior, 
because the Parties attempt to increase their votes. Voters decide which Party 
will become the incumbent through their voting. The incumbent Party sets the tax 
policy, which takes money from Voters and redistributes it to Oligarchs. Oligarchs 
donate money to the Party that proposes a higher tax, which influences Voters’ 
vote choices and indirectly affects the policy positions of Parties. 
 
Design concepts: Stochasticity 
Many elements of the OLIGO model are randomized, or stochastic. In the initiali-
zation of a model run, Party positions are picked from a random normal distribu-
tion along the ideo and olig axes, and Voter ideo positions are picked from a ran-
dom normal distribution, as in Laver (2005). Oligarch gross-incomes are drawn 
from a random lognormal distribution, a common model of income distribution 
(Salem & Mount 1974). 
 During a run cycle, Parties and Oligarchs act as Hunter agents, which 
means that if their previous action did not improve their outcome, they will choose 
a different action at random. Voters act as probabilistic reflex agents when they 
update their olig-salience values, as they will not always “notice” a high tax rate 
and update their olig-salience in response, although they likelihood a Voter will 
increase its olig-salience strictly increases with the tax rate. In the case of a tie in 
an election or a voter equidistant from both Parties, the winning Party or vote re-
cipient is decided by a fair random draw, as in Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 
(2003). 
 
Design concepts: Observation 
For each cycle of each model run, we recorded the Parties’ mean position along 
each policy axis, the difference between the Parties’ positions along each policy 
axis, the tax rate, the Voters’ mean olig-salience value, the Oligarchs’ mean do-
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nation size, whether the incumbent Party was closer to the center of the ideo axis 
than its opponent, and whether the incumbent Party had a higher olig value that 
its opponent. 
 
Initialization 
Before a run begins, 2 Parties, 100 Voters, and 5 Oligarchs are created. We test-
ed the model with 50 Voters and 5 Oligarchs, as well as with 100 Voters and 10 
or 50 Oligarchs, while total Voter income and total Oligarch income were held 
constant. These variations did not produce meaningful differences in outcomes, 
so the model appears robust to changes in the ratio of Voter count to Oligarch 
count. 
As noted above, Parties are initialized with ideo and olig positions drawn 
from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 1/3 the radius of 
each policy axis, as in Laver (2005). Voter ideo positions are drawn in the same 
manner. A redraw is taken for any value outside the range from MIN-POS (-100) 
to MAX-POS (100). Voters’ olig-salience is initialized to 0. 
We also tested a version of the model where Voter ideo positions were 
drawn from a bimodal distribution, but the results were not significantly different 
from results with the unimodal distribution. We chose a bimodal distribution as an 
alternative because it can represent a polarized population of voters, as suggest-
ed by Downs (1957). We constructed the distribution using a mixture of Gaussi-
ans to represent polarized voter positions as in (DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson 
1996). In our bimodal distribution of Voter ideo positions, we constructed an 
equal mixture of two Gaussian distributions to have the same overall standard 
deviation as our unimodal distribution (33.3), where each of the two Gaussians 
had a standard deviation of half that amount (16.7). We arrived at a Gaussian 
mixture with norms 28.9 and -28.9, standard deviations of 16.7, and mixing pa-
rameter 0.5. 
 Oligarchs are initialized such that their gross-income values are drawn 
from a lognormal distribution, which is commonly used to model the distribution of 
incomes (Salem & Mount 1974). A lognormal distribution is appropriate for mod-
eling income distributions because unlike a normal distribution, it assigns proba-
bility zero to negative values and near zero probability to very small positive val-
ues; and it has been shown empirically to represent actual income distributions 
accurately. Although only 5 Oligarchs are present in the model whose results are 
shown, we tested the model with 10 Oligarchs and 50 Oligarchs to ensure ro-
bustness with the small number of samples from a lognormal distribution. There 
was no meaningful difference in results with greater numbers of Oligarchs, while 
the total Oligarch income was held constant. Oligarch counts in the range of 5 to 
50 appear reasonable as a model of real privileged groups, as Olson (1965) 
notes that most trade associations have 25-50 members, with 1/3 having fewer 
than 20, and most contributions to a trade association come from a small subset 
of the members.  
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Input data 
The model does not use data from external sources. 
 
Model Variant: Party-Ideo-Motivated Model 
We present here the Party-Ideo-Motivated Model (PIMM), the first of two variants 
on the base OLIGO model that was presented above. The PIMM was developed 
to remove a couple of simplifying assumptions of the Ideo-Indifferent Model (IIM) 
and to improve the model's fit for real world data of changes in party support over 
time. 
 The PIMM introduces an ideological motivation for each Party, in addition 
to the Parties' vote seeking motives. The two Parties are distinguished as the 
blue, liberal Party and the red, conservative Party. The blue Party has a bliss 
point along the ideo axis of -33, the red Party at +33. Moreover, the Parties are 
unwilling to adopt ideo policy positions on the "other side" of the opposing Party's 
position. For example, the red Party will not adopt an ideo position less than or 
equal to the blue Party's. 
 The PIMM makes some Voters "loyalists", instead of having all Voters be 
"swing" Voters as in the IIM. Loyalist Voters are not influenced by campaign 
spending or the olig position of Parties, but vote based entirely on the positions of 
the Parties along the ideo axis. Theorists including Downs (1957) note that many 
voters act as loyalists, in that they habitually vote for the same party or the party 
that matches their ideology best. 
 In the PIMM, a SWING-VOTER-FRACTION parameter of 0.33 indicates 
that 2/3 of Voters will be loyalists, and only 1/3 of Voters will alter their votes 
based on campaign donations or Party olig position. We chose these parameter 
settings based on a Pew Research study that shows approximately 33% of regis-
tered voters in the United States were swing voters, as of 2008. Since 2008, the 
fraction of voters classified as swing voters has become smaller, so this parame-
ter setting is conservative. (Pew Research 2012.) 
 Initial positions of the two Parties along the ideo axis in the PIMM are at 
the Parties' bliss points of -33 and +33, rather than being drawn from a 0-mean 
Gaussian distribution.  
 In the PIMM, if a Party's position update function directs it to adopt an ideo 
position that is on the "wrong side" of its opposing Party's current policy, the Par-
ty will instead keep its ideo position unchanged in that cycle. If a Party's ideo po-
sition is on the "wrong side" of its bliss point (lower than +33 or higher than -33), 
the Party adds a bias term to its updated ideo position, which depends on the 
distance from its bliss point. The bias term is 0 at the bliss point and approaches 
PARTY-EPSILON at the edge of policy space, so that in the worst case this bias 
completely cancels a move in the "wrong direction." For the red Party, the bias 
term is calculated as PARTY-EPSILON / (1 + e ^ ((50 - (33 - ideo)) / 8)). The blue 
Party function is similar. 
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Model Variant: All-Ideo-Motivated Model 
Our last model variant is the All-Ideo-Motivated Model (AIMM), which is derived 
from the Party-Ideo-Motivated Model (PIMM), but assigns an ideo preference in 
favor of "conservative" policies to the Oligarchs. It is reasonable to assign Oli-
garchs a preference for conservative policies because there is real world evi-
dence that business interest groups typically hold moderately conservative views 
on "unifying" issues (Smith 2000). Smith shows that business interest groups 
usually adopt conservative stances on policies that have broad implications for all 
market sectors. But Smith notes that a business-oriented interest group may op-
pose a conservative, free market policy if the policy could hurt its profits. For ex-
ample, an industry lobbying group might support increased government spend-
ing, subsidies, or regulatory barriers to entry for the group's own industry, even 
though such policies tend to increase taxes and government and spending. 
 Note that in the AIMM, Oligarchs update their donation-level values just as 
in the other models, based on changes in profits. Oligarchs in the AIMM do not 
account for the ideo axis position of the incumbent Party when deciding how to 
adjust donation levels, only in deciding which Party to donate to. Oligarchs in the 
AIMM can be thought of as industry leaders who seek to maximize profits, but 
believe that one way to do so is by supporting the Party with a certain ideology, 
regardless of the Party's current policy on industry-related issues. Thus, the Oli-
garchs are more likely to donate to the Party with a preferred ideo axis position, 
but if campaign donations do not lead to increased profits, the donation level will 
be reduced. 
 In our implementation of the AIMM, Oligarchs have a preferred ideo posi-
tion of OLIGARCH-IDEO = 33, which is moderately conservative. Oligarchs are 
assigned an OLIGARCH-IDEO-OLIG-RATIO = 0.5, which controls the relative 
importance of olig and ideo position for Oligarchs considering which Party to 
support. Because the two axes are weighted equally in our parameterization, Oli-
garchs donate to the Party whose distance from [olig=100, ideo=33] is least by 
Manhattan distance. The amount of the donation is based on a function of the 
Parties' distance from the Oligarchs' bliss point as in IIM and PIMM, but in the 
AIMM a Party's position along both axes is considered together, leading to a 
more complex calculation. In brief, the PARTY-OLIG-DIFFERENCE is replaced 
by PARTY-OVERALL-DIFFERENCE. PARTY-OVERALL-DIFFERENCE is also in 
the range [0, 1], but it incorporates both policy axes by taking the absolute value 
of the mean of red's distance minus blue's distance, over each the two axes. To 
ensure the result is in [0, 1], the difference in distances between red and blue 
along each axis is divided by the maximum possible difference along that axis 
before the mean is taken. 
 
Simulation experiments 
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In this section we present: (1) the outcome variables used to describe the results 
of model runs, (2) an example run of the model that should help readers to un-
derstand how the model works, (3) the verification tests we performed to ensure 
that the model is properly calibrated, and (4) the results of hypothesis tests where 
we attempted to confirm that the model conforms to prior theory on the emer-
gence of Oligarch and Voter behavior.  
All statistical analyses were performed using the R statistics program. Ex-
periments were carried out in NetLogo using the BehaviorSpace extension. 
 
Outcome variables 
We used three statistics to measure Oligarchs’ success in capturing a subsidy 
from the government: the mean voter-tax-rate, the mean olig position of the Par-
ties, and the fraction of run cycles in which the winning Party had both the greater 
olig value and the less central ideo value (in other words, the greater ideo posi-
tion absolute value). The greater any of these statistics, the more successful Oli-
garchs were at influencing election outcomes. 
To measure the efficiency of Oligarchs at capturing a subsidy, we used the 
mean profit earned by Oligarchs, which is calculated as the total tax collected, 
minus the total campaign donations by Oligarchs, all divided by the number of 
Oligarchs. 
To measure the campaign donations of Oligarchs, we used the mean frac-
tion of gross-income donated by Oligarchs, which is the mean of the Oligarchs’ 
donation-size parameter, times the PARTY-OLIG-DIFFERENCE-SCALED factor. 
To measure how successful Voters were at keeping Parties near the cen-
ter of policy space in the ideo dimension, we used the absolute value of the mean 
of the Parties’ ideo values. 
 
Typical run description 
We present results from a typical run of the OLIGO model, to help readers un-
derstand basic model behavior. In the example run, the model was run once for 
1300 cycles. In Figures 5, 6, and 9, we present time series data on the positions 
of the two Parties, the mean fraction of gross-income donated to campaigns by 
the Oligarchs, and the Oligarchs’ mean profit. 
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Figure 5. Party position versus time in a typical model run. Left: Gray lines show 
current difference in olig (top) or ideo (bottom) position between Parties. Black 
lines show all-time averages. 
Right: Dark red and blue lines show Parties’ current positions in olig (top) or ideo 
(bottom) dimension. Light red and blue lines show all-time averages for each Par-
ty. Gray lines show all-time averages for the incumbent Party. 
 
 Note that in a typical model run, Party ideo values tend to remain near the 
central value of zero, and they tend to remain close together. This makes sense, 
because by the median voter theorem, Voters evenly distributed about zero on a 
policy axis will tend to vote for the Party whose position is closest to zero. A Party 
that is much further than its opponent from the center will tend to be punished by 
Voters, many of which will find the other Party closer in policy space and vote for 
that Party. If a Party is far from the center along the ideo axis, it will be relatively 
easy for its opponent to win more votes, because most positions in policy space 
will be preferred by the median Voter to that Party’s position. 
 Parties’ olig values tend to be farther apart than their ideo values. This is 
because Voters typically have low olig-salience values, so they will not punish a 
Party as heavily for being farther away along the olig axis as for being farther 
away along the ideo axis. This means that a Party could receive more marginal 
benefit from the greater donations it receives from Oligarchs by taking a higher 
ideo position, than the marginal cost of taking that less popular position with Vot-
ers. As a result, Parties are able to adopt olig values greater than the minimal 
value, even though Voters prefer Parties that adopt the minimum. 
 Often during an OLIGO model run, one Party occupies a significantly 
higher olig axis position than the other. Although both Parties' mean olig axis po-
sitions have a 95% confidence interval that includes 0, there is a mean difference 
between the two Parties' olig positions in a particular step of 56.4, with 95% con-
fidence interval [52.5, 60.4]. Recall that the full range of olig space is [-100, 100]. 
Accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Journal	  of	  Artificial	  Societies	  and	  Social	  Simulations.	  
20	  
Thus, the two Parties tend to propose significantly different tax rates (determined 
by olig axis position) in a given time step, although the Parties may later switch 
orientations along this axis so that neither promotes higher taxes than the other 
on average. Individual model runs, as shown in Figure 6, tend to show occasional 
spikes in tax rate where a Party with extremely high olig value is elected, followed 
by a spike in Voter olig-salience, and a reduction in tax rates as the elected Party 
moves to a lower olig value or is voted out again.  
 
Figure 6. Mean Voter olig-salience and tax rate, versus time step, over a single 
run of 120 steps after the 300-step warm-up period. 
 
One Party typically breaks away from the other along the olig axis, adopt-
ing a much greater olig value than its opponent, likely because only one Party 
can receive donations from the Oligarchs at a time, so there is more marginal 
benefit to this Party in seeking greater donations for itself, than to its opponent in 
increasing its olig position to reduce the Oligarch donation amount. In contrast, 
Parties frequently trade places being closer to the center along the ideo dimen-
sion. For a video of a typical model run, see Figure 7. A video of the Party-Ideo-
Motivated model appears for comparison, as Figure 8. 
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Figure 7. Video of a base model (IIM) run of 500 steps. The five top circles are 
Oligarchs. Oligarch color shows which Party was recently supported, radius is 
proportional to amount donated, and label shows donation-size. The two squares 
are Parties. Party width is proportional to votes received, label indicates if votes 
increased or decreased, and outline shows the incumbent. The 100 bottom cir-
cles are Voters. Voter color shows which Party was voted for. The ideo axis is 
vertical and the olig axis is horizontal. Each Party and Voter’s location corre-
sponds to its position in policy space. 
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Figure 8. Video of a Party-Ideo-Motivated Model run, beginning after the 300-step 
warm-up period. 
 
 Time series plots averaged over 100 runs of the OLIGO model suggest 
that a 300 cycle warm-up period was sufficient for most model statistics to be-
come stable, in the sense that the means of most model statistics across runs 
were not dependent on the time step. In particular, the mean olig and ideo posi-
tions of the Parties, the tax rate, and the mean olig-salience of Voters had nearly 
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the same means across runs, regardless of the time step after warm-up (Figure 
9). For mean Oligarch profit, however, there was change over time; this variable 
did not seem to attain a stable value over time steps, even in the mean across 
runs (Figure 10), although its drift appeared to stop after 300 steps. 
 
Figure 9. Mean Voter olig-salience and tax rate, versus time step, averaged over 
100 runs. 
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Figure 10. Mean Oligarch profit versus time step, averaged over 100 runs. 
 
Experimental methods 
We performed six computational experiments with the IIM version of the OLIGO 
model (Figure 11). 
 
1. We ran the base model 100 times to obtain summary statistics.  
2. To explore how Oligarchs and Voters would act if their donations or olig-
salience had no effect on Party olig positions, we modified our model to 
set Party olig positions at fixed values that could not change during a run; 
we ran this model 100 times. 
3. To study the effect of fixing Oligarch donation-size at various levels, we 
ran a parameter sweep for the initial Oligarch donation-size, and we fixed 
Oligarch donation-size in place so that Oligarchs could not change their 
donation-size from the assigned value. We ran the model 20 times at each 
value. 
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4. We ran a parameter sweep for VOTER-AD-DECAY-FACTOR, which af-
fects how strongly Voters react to campaign donations. We ran the model 
20 times at each value. 
5. We ran a parameter sweep over the initial olig-salience of Voters, in a 
model variation where Voters could not change their olig-salience from its 
original value. We ran the model 20 times at each value. 
6. We ran a parameter sweep over the VOTER-MEMORY-STRENGTH, 
which affects how long Voters maintain a high olig-salience after increas-
ing their olig-salience due to high taxes. We ran the model 20 times at 
each value. 
 
Figure 11. Experimental conditions. 
 We also analyzed two variants of the IIM, which we call the Party-Ideo-
Motivated Model (PIMM) and All-Ideo-Motivated Model (AIMM). Recall that in the 
Party-Ideo-Motivated Model, unlike in the IIM, each Party has a preferred ideo 
axis position, and some Voters are loyalists instead of swing voters. In the All-
Ideo-Motivated Model, changes from the PIMM are retained, and additionally, 
Oligarchs have a preferred ideo position that favors the red, conservative Party. 
Oligarchs in the AIMM will donate to the red Party even if the blue Party's olig 
position is greater, as long as this difference in olig position is outweighed by the 
difference in ideo position.  
 To evaluate the results of our experiments, we used hypothesis tests that 
make minimal assumptions about the distribution of results. We used Welch two-
sample t-tests to test for different means between samples, where it seemed like-
ly that the samples had different variances, so a conventional two-sample t-test 
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would not work properly. We used cross-correlation, with lags of -5 to 5 run 
steps, to look for effects of one variable on another in our default model run. We 
chose a lagged approach so that we could detect relationships between variables 
that require multiple run steps to emerge. To evaluate the effect of the sweep pa-
rameter on other variables in our parameter sweeps, we used Spearman correla-
tion to look for a monotonic relationship between the variables that might be non-
linear. 
 
Model verification 
We performed a series of verification tests to ensure that the OLIGO model be-
haved in accordance with prior results from political economics as well as with 
common sense. 
 According to the median voter theorem, Voters with normally distributed 
preferences will tend to elect a Party whose position in policy space is aligned 
with the preferences of the median Voter. Because the OLIGO model initializes 
Voters with ideo values drawn from a random normal distribution centered on ze-
ro, the mean ideo value of Parties should be zero when averaged over many 
runs, because Parties seek to increase the votes they receive. A two-tailed 
Welch’s t-test on the 100 default runs could not reject the hypothesis that the 
mean Party ideo position was equal to zero, p = 0.84, 95% confidence interval (-
1.042, 0.842) in a possible range of ideo values from -100 to 100.  If the base model is properly calibrated and scaled, Oligarch donations 
should not dominate the effect of Voter preferences. In other words, Oligarchs 
should not be able to capture severe redistributive taxes. Specifically, we ex-
pected the mean Party olig to be below zero (i.e., closer to Voters’ preferred val-
ue than to Oligarchs’) and the mean Party olig to be below the mean Party ideo 
value. A one-tailed Welch’s t-test confirmed that the mean Party olig was indeed 
less than zero, p < 2.2e-16, M = -45.3. 
 For our model to perform reliably, it needs to be non-degenerate – that is, 
all agents must take some action at equilibrium that has an effect on model out-
comes. To verify the non-degeneracy of the base model, we used one-tailed 
Welch’s t-tests to verify all of the following conditions, p < 2.2e-16: 
• mean olig position of Parties > MIN-POS 
• mean olig-salience of Voters > 0 
• mean tax rate < MAX-TAX 
• mean Oligarch donation-size > 0 
 
Results: Base model experiment 
Cross-correlations revealed that in runs of the base OLIGO model, called the 
Ideo-Indifferent Model or IIM for clarity, both tax rate and mean Oligarch profit 
were positively correlated with mean olig-salience of Voters at small lags (Figure 
12). A two-sided 95% confidence interval for the cross-correlation at each lag 
was computed by treating the cross-correlations at that lag from different runs as 
IID samples from a random variable and computing the t confidence interval, 
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based on 100 runs. The correlation had a maximum over lags at 0.695 in [0.677, 
0.713] for tax rate to olig-salience, and at 0.678 in [0.659, 0.698] for profit to olig-
salience; both of these correlation sizes are “strong.” Tax rate led changes in ol-
ig-salience, with much larger correlations at small negative lags than at positive 
lags. Profit also led changes in olig-salience. These results make sense, because 
the model is specified such that Voters are more likely to “notice” the redistribu-
tive tax and increase their olig-salience when the tax rate is high. When tax rates 
are high, profits tend to be high also, because profits are computed by subtract-
ing donations from taxes collected. 
 
Figure 12. Cross-correlation of tax rate to mean Voter olig-salience, in the base 
model. Cross-correlations were taken for each run and averaged over 100 runs. 
 
 The mean donation-size of Oligarchs was positively correlated with mean 
Voter olig-salience, but the maximum correlation over lags was only 0.243 in 
[0.201, 0.285], which is “weak” (Figure 13). Neither variable of donation-size and 
olig-salience appeared to lead the other, as the cross-correlations were nearly 
constant over small lags. This indicates that although Voter olig-salience tended 
to be high when Oligarch donations were high, there was little immediate effect of 
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change in one variable on the other, for the small changes that typically occurred 
in our base model. Indeed, our model does not include rules that directly link the-
se two variables, so it is understandable that they did not produce a strongly 
peaked cross-correlation plot. 
 
 
Figure 13. Cross-correlation of mean Voter olig-salience to mean Oligarch dona-
tion-size, in the base model. Cross-correlations were taken for each run and av-
eraged over 100 runs. 
 
 To evaluate the robustness of the results from IIM over changes to input 
parameters, we performed the same statistical analyses for several variations of 
IIM. We modified IIM in one of several ways: (1) IIM with 10 Oligarchs instead of 
5; (2) IIM with 50 Oligarchs instead of 5; (3) IIM with 50 Voters instead of 100; (4) 
IIM with a bimodal distribution of Voter ideo positions (mixture of 2 Gaussians) 
instead of a normal distribution; and (5) IIM where Oligarchs are free to keep their 
donation level the same from one step to the next instead of increasing or de-
creasing it. In all of these variations, output parameter results were not signifi-
cantly different from in the base IIM. See Table 1. It does appear that introducing 
the null action for Oligarchs leads to slightly increased Oligarch profits and taxes, 
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with increased donation rates. But other outcome measures are very similar be-
tween the null option model and the base IIM, so these differences do not appear 
to alter our key findings. Note that when Oligarch and Voter counts were 
changed, the total income of each group was kept the same.  
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of Ideo-Indifferent Model, and variations with 50 Voters, 10 
Oligarchs, 50 Oligarchs, bimodal distribution of Voter ideo position, and null do-
nation change option for Oligarchs.  
* 50-Voter max and mean votes were multiplied by 100/50 for comparison.  
** 10-Oligarch mean profits were multiplied by 10/5 for comparison. 
*** 50-Oligarch mean profits were multiplied by 50/5 for comparison. 
 
 Our model does appear sensitive to a change in the fraction of total in-
come assigned to the Oligarchs (Table 2). We performed a sensitivity analysis in 
which the IIM was analyzed with Oligarchs receiving 2% or 10% of total income, 
instead of 5% as in the base version of IIM. We expected that increasing Oligarch 
income would allow Oligarchs to donate more money to Party campaigns, lead-
ing to greater advertising effects, higher mean Party olig values, and greater Oli-
garch profits. This hypothesis appears to be supported by the results, based on a 
comparison of outcomes at 2%, 5%, and 10% Oligarch income fractions. In-
creased Oligarch income increased mean taxes by 0.018 from 2% to 5% (Co-
hen's d = 1.05) and by 0.037 from 5% to 10% (d = 1.36). Mean Party olig posi-
tions increased by 10.8 from 2% to 5% (d = 0.793), and by 11.1 from 5% to 10% 
(d = 0.77). Mean Oligarch profit increased by 2.17 from 2% to 5% (d = 0.672), 
and by 3.82 from 5% to 10% (d = 0.836). All of these Cohen's d values are 
"large." 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Ideo-Indifferent Model, Party-Ideo-Motivated Model, All-
Ideo-Motivated Model, IIM with fixed Party olig position, IIM with 2% of income to 
Oligarchs, and IIM with 10% of income to Oligarchs. Mean donation is the mean 
donation level parameter over all Oligarchs. Mean tax was not recorded for the 
fixed Party olig experiment. 
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Results: Fixed Party olig experiment 
In the fixed Party olig experiment, Parties were initialized with randomly drawn 
olig and ideo positions as usual, but their olig values were permanently fixed to 
their initial values. As a result, Voters could not induce Parties to reduce their olig 
values by voting against the Party with greater olig, although Voters might have 
been able to prevent the Party with greater olig from winning elections and set-
ting the tax rate by its olig position. Similarly, Oligarchs were not able to alter the 
mean olig value by donating to the campaign of the Party with greater olig, alt-
hough Oligarchs might have been able to increase their favored Party’s chance 
of winning elections and setting the tax rate. 
A one-tailed Welch’s two-sample t-test confirmed our expectation that Oli-
garchs would donate less money on average when Party olig values were fixed 
compared to in the default model, p < 2.2e-16. The mean fraction of Oligarch 
gross-income donated in the base model was 0.112, and in the fixed Party olig 
model it was only 0.092, or less than one tenth as much (Figure 14). Due to a 
high variance in donation level, however, Cohen's d for the difference in donation 
levels between the two models is only a small 0.26. Note that Figure 14 and all 
other box plots in this work are Tukey box plots, where the middle line is the me-
dian, the lower and upper box ends are the lower and upper quartiles, the lower 
staple marks the lowest datum within 1.5 times the box height of the lower quar-
tile, and the upper staple marks the highest datum within 1.5 times the box height 
of the upper quartile. 
Another one-tailed Welch’s two-sample t-test showed that Oligarchs 
earned higher profits in the fixed Party olig model than in the base model, p < 
2.2e-16. Oligarchs in the fixed Party olig model earned approximately 2.38 times 
the profits of Oligarchs in the base model on average, for a very large Cohen's d 
of 7.04. Oligarchs’ profits were higher because they were spending much less on 
campaign donations, and the expected Party olig value of zero at initialization 
was greater than the mean Party olig value of -45.3 from the default model, so 
taxes tended to be higher in the fixed Party olig model. 
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Figure 14. Mean fraction of gross-income Oligarchs donated. Each time step of 
each run produced one data point.  
 
Results: Voter olig-salience parameter sweep 
In the Voter olig-salience parameter sweep, Voters were initialized to all have the 
same olig-salience value, ranging from 0 to 1.0 in intervals of 0.2 over the sweep. 
Voters were not allowed to change their olig-salience values during a model run. 
This meant that they did not adapt to different tax rates by changing their prefer-
ences over Party positions. 
  We hypothesized that when olig-salience is higher, Oligarchs would have 
less success in influencing policy. This would be evident in the form of the follow-
ing outcomes: lower tax rates, lower mean Party olig value, lower Oligarch prof-
its, and a lower frequency of the Party with greater olig value defeating an oppo-
nent with a more centrist ideo value. Because Oligarch campaign donations 
would be less likely to increase tax rates with a high Voter olig-salience, Oligarch 
donations would be lower when olig-salience is fixed at higher values. The down-
side for Voters of a high Voter olig-salience, we hypothesized, was that it would 
allow the mean Party ideo position to be farther from zero, the expected prefer-
ence of the median Voter. 
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 Our hypotheses were supported by the results (Table 3). There was a 
strong negative Spearman correlation (-0.76) between olig-salience and the fre-
quency of the Party with greater olig defeating a more centrist Party, and there 
was a moderate positive correlation (0.32) of olig-salience with the absolute value 
of the mean Party’s ideo value (Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15. Absolute value of the mean Party ideo position, from the Voter olig-
salience parameter sweep. Each time step of each run produced one data point. 
Spearman correlation = 0.32. 
 
 For the other outcome variables, however, correlations were weak until the 
two highest olig-salience parameter settings (0.8 and 1.0) were dropped. This is 
because when the olig-salience value is fixed at a very high value, the OLIGO 
model degenerates into a one-dimensional policy space model, where Voters all 
share a common position at one extreme of the sole policy axis. In this degener-
ate case, the Hunter strategy that the Parties follow does not work well, because 
if the Parties are not within a step length of each other along the one meaningful 
policy axis, the losing Party cannot improve its vote count no matter which direc-
tion it moves, because it will still be farther from all Voters. Therefore, both Par-
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ties will wander aimlessly, until the losing Party happens to cross paths with the 
winning Party. As a result, when olig-salience values are greater than about 0.6, 
Oligarch power is likely to increase. This degenerate phenomenon is not usually 
a problem for the OLIGO model, because such high mean Voter olig-salience 
values almost never occur, except in the parameter sweep. 
 
 
Table 3. Correlations of sweep parameter with mean Oligarch profit, mean Oli-
garch donation parameter, mean tax rate, and fraction of runs where Party of 
higher olig position defeats Party of more centrist ideo position. Olig-salience-
sweep low-sal gives results for the olig-salience sweep, omitting the conditions 
with olig-salience equal to 0.8 or 1.0. Donation level correlation is not reported for 
the donation-size-sweep because donation level is the sweeping parameter. 
 
When the 0.8 and 1.0 olig-salience parameter conditions were dropped, 
leaving only the conditions (0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6), meaningful trends emerged. There 
was a moderate to strong negative correlation between olig-salience and tax rate 
(-0.59) mean Oligarch profit (-0.57), mean Party olig (-0.54), and mean Oligarch 
donation fraction (-0.35). A box plot of the effect of olig-salience on tax rates 
showed a clear negative trend up to an olig-salience of 0.6, followed by an up-
ward trend for very high olig-salience values (Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. Tax rate from the Voter olig-salience parameter sweep. Each time 
step of each run produced one data point. Spearman correlation (up through olig-
salience 0.6) = -0.59. 
 
Results: Oligarch donation-size parameter sweep 
In the Oligarch donation-size parameter sweep, the donation-size of all Oligarchs 
was fixed to a certain value at the beginning of each run, and Oligarchs were not 
allowed to change this value. Recall that the donation-size parameter sets the 
maximum fraction of gross-income that an Oligarch can donate. The actual frac-
tion of gross-income donated by an Oligarch is the product of the donation-size 
parameter and a scaling factor that increases with the difference between the 
Parties’ olig positions. 
 We hypothesized that in the donation-size parameter sweep, greater do-
nation-size values would produce better results for Oligarchs, up until the highest 
donation-size values, where diminishing returns would make profits decline. 
 Our hypotheses were mainly supported by the results. There were moder-
ate to strong positive correlations between donation-size and the frequency of a 
higher olig Party defeating a more centrist ideo Party (0.86) and mean Party olig 
value (0.38), and a weak positive correlation of donation-size with tax rate (0.26). 
Oligarch profits had a positive correlation with donation-size, but at 0.16, it was 
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too low to be meaningful. The box plot in Figure 17 shows that there was a clear 
positive trend in profits with increasing donation-size, although past 0.6, variance 
increased and losses became common. 
 
Figure 17. Mean Oligarch profit from the Oligarch donation-size sweep. Each 
time step of each run produced one data point. Spearman correlation = 0.16. 
 
Results: Voter awareness sweeps 
Two parameter sweep experiments tested the effect on model outcomes of set-
tings that adjust Voter awareness of tax rates. In the ad decay factor sweep, the 
VOTER-AD-DECAY-FACTOR parameter was set in the range from -0.12 to -
0.02, in steps of size 0.02. Recall that the VOTER-AD-DECAY-FACTOR deter-
mines the effect of a campaign donation on the distance Voters perceive to a 
Party. A higher ad decay factor (less negative) causes a given campaign dona-
tion to have more influence on Voter perceptions. 
 In the memory strength sweep, the VOTER-MEMORY-STRENGTH pa-
rameter was adjusted from 0.1 to 0.9, in steps of size 0.2. The VOTER-
MEMORY-STRENGTH parameter is the forgetting rate, that is, the factor by 
which a Voter’s olig-salience is multiplied at each run step if the Voter does not 
“notice” a high tax rate. The higher the memory strength, the more slowly a Vot-
er’s olig-salience will decline between events that cause it to increase. 
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 We predicted that increasing ad decay factor, and increasing voter 
memory strength, would each be correlated negatively with mean Oligarch dona-
tion-size, and with measures of Oligarch success, including the frequency of the 
Party with higher olig value defeating a Party of more centrist ideo value, tax rate, 
mean Oligarch profit, and mean Party olig position. 
 The results confirmed our expectations. In the ad decay sweep, we found 
moderate to strong negative correlations of VOTER-AD-DECAY-FACTOR with 
the frequency of a higher olig Party defeating a centrist Party (-0.76), tax rate (-
0.28) (Figure 18), mean Oligarch profit (-0.27), mean Party olig value (-0.26), and 
mean Oligarch donation-size (-0.26) (Figure 19). Similarly, in the memory 
strength sweep, we found negative correlations of VOTER-MEMORY-
STRENGTH with the frequency of a higher olig Party defeating a centrist Party (-
0.37), tax rate (-0.37), mean Oligarch profit (-0.37), mean Party olig value (-0.42), 
and mean Oligarch donation-size (-0.14). 
 
Figure 18. Tax rate from the ad decay sweep. Each time step of each run pro-
duced one data point. Spearman correlation = -0.28. 
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Figure 19. Mean Oligarch donation-size from the ad decay sweep. Each time 
step of each run produced one data point. Spearman correlation = -0.26. 
 
Results: Party-Ideo-Motivated Model 
In the Party-Ideo-Motivated Model (PIMM), Parties move along the ideo axis by 
adding a bias term to the position they would ordinarily take as they adapt to the 
reward-and-punishment of polling results. This bias term tends to steer Parties 
toward their preferred ideo positions of -33 (blue Party) and +33 (red Party). Re-
sults indicate that the mean ideo position for the red Party in the PIMM is 5.2, 
versus -5.2 for the blue Party, compared with 0.0 for both Parties in the IIM (Co-
hen's d = 1.06). In the PIMM as in the IIM, Voters' ideo preferences have a mean 
of approximately 0, which pushes Parties toward centrist ideo policies, but the 
Parties' own biases in the PIMM push them back toward their respective bliss 
points. 
 The correlation between Oligarch donations and the frequency with which 
the Party with greater olig value defeats a more centrist Party is much weaker in 
PIMM compared to IIM: The correlation is 0.353 in PIMM versus 0.864 in IIM, and 
the difference is highly significant (p < 0.001) using Fisher's r-to-z and a t-test. 
This result makes sense, because the loyalist Voters in the PIMM dampen the 
effect of Oligarch donations to the Party with higher olig position. Loyalist Voters 
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are not affected by campaign donations and vote based only on Party ideo posi-
tion, so they tend to support centrist Parties rather than Parties that receive high 
donations. 
 The correlation between mean Oligarch profit and Voter olig-salience is 
greater in PIMM than in IIM: The correlation is 0.716 in PIMM versus 0.678 in IIM, 
and the comparison is statistically significant (p = 0.099) using Fisher's r-to-z and 
a t-test. The correlation between Oligarch profit and Voter olig-salience may be 
more pronounced in PIMM because loyalist Voters in PIMM do not change their 
votes as a result of high taxes, so salience must become greater among swing 
voters before they can vote out a Party that has a high olig position. 
 
Results: Validation of the PIMM with Polling Data 
We performed experiments to validate the performance of the Party-Ideo-
Motivated Model (PIMM) against real world data on changes over time in two-
party opinion polls. As outcome measures for comparison with opinion polls, we 
analyzed the mean absolute change in percent support for the conservative Par-
ty, the minimum observed percent support for the conservative Party, the stand-
ard deviation of change in percent support for the conservative Party, and the 
maximum observed absolute change in percent support for the conservative Par-
ty. That is, we investigated the following questions: How well does our model re-
flect rates of change in party support over time, from real world polling data? For 
example, does our model reflect the typical monthly percent change in support 
for a party in the US two-party system? Does the range of observed support lev-
els for a party reflect the observed range over a corresponding time period in US 
polling data? Is the range of percent changes in support for a party similar to that 
in the US system? All observations were over periods of 120 cycles, with 100 tri-
als each for the IIM, PIMM, and AIMM. The size of differences from the observed 
polling results was evaluated via Cohen's d. 
 The PIMM was only trivially different from polling results in mean absolute 
change in percent support (Cohen's d = 0.001). See Table 4. PIMM had a slightly 
higher minimum observed conservative percent support than the polls (d = 
0.266). PIMM did, however, have a moderate increase in standard deviation of 
change in percent support from 2.87 to 3.31 (d = 0.666), and a large increase in 
maximum observed absolute change in percent support from 8 to 11.57 (d = 
1.266). Even so, PIMM appears to provide a reasonable approximation to the 
changes over time observed in percent support for two parties in the polling data. 
 
 
Table 4. Comparison of Gallup poll, Ideo-Indifferent Model, Party-Ideo-Motivated 
Model, and All-Ideo-Motivated Model results. 
 
Accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  Journal	  of	  Artificial	  Societies	  and	  Social	  Simulations.	  
39	  
 The basic model version, IIM, had large differences from the polling data 
across all measures. IIM had much lower minimum observed conservative per-
cent support, 17.6 compared to 34 in the polls (d = 1.448). IIM also had much 
higher mean absolute change in percent support, at 8.1 rather than 2.3 (d = 
2.961). Maximum observed absolute change in percent support was much higher 
in IIM than in the polls, at 51.7 versus 8 (d = 2.514).  The standard deviation of 
change in percent support is higher in IIM, at 13.00 versus 2.87 (d = 2.526). In 
general, IIM has much greater variability in party support from one step to the 
next than either PIMM or the poll results. IIM also produces a much greater range 
of party support percentages than are observed in the real world data. (The All-
Ideo-Motivated Model, introduced below, produced results somewhere between 
the large jumps in votes of the IIM and the more realistic, smaller jumps of the 
PIMM.) 
 These results are reasonable, as they show that the introduction of loyalist 
Voters and Party ideological preferences in the Party-Ideo-Motivated Model leads 
to reduced variance and range in percent Party support, compared to the Ideo-
Indifferent Model. Two-thirds of Voters in the PIMM are loyalists, i.e., they vote 
based on the ideo axis positions of the two Parties and are not swayed by 
changes in tax rate, Party olig position, or campaign donations. The presence of 
loyalist Voters dampens the effects of changes in tax rate, Party olig position, and 
Oligarch donation level. Changes in party support from one step to the next tend 
to be decreased. The result is changes in party support over time that more 
closely reflect real world polling data in the PIMM, compared to the IIM. 
 We focus in our reporting of results on the Ideo-Indifferent Model out-
comes, because the IIM is simpler to describe than the PIMM, it still captures key 
features of our model, and its results are very similar to the results of the PIMM, 
except in terms of the rate of change in party support. We do, however, present 
results from the PIMM and AIMM for comparison in table form. 
 
Results: All-Ideo-Motivated Model 
Recall that the All-Ideo-Motivated Model (AIMM) is similar to the Party-Ideo-
Motivated Model, but in the AIMM, Oligarchs have a preferred Party ideo position 
of +33. The Oligarch’s preferred ideo position is also the same as the conserva-
tive Party's bliss point on the ideo axis. Oligarchs in the AIMM choose which Par-
ty to donate to based on a combination of Party ideo position and olig position, 
unlike in the IMM and PIMM, in which Oligarchs are indifferent to Party ideo posi-
tion.  
 We will discuss AIMM results by comparing them to PIMM results. In the 
AIMM, Oligarchs are less efficient at capturing high tax rates than in the PIMM, 
and also donate less in the AIMM (Table 2). In the AIMM, mean Oligarch dona-
tions are much lower than in PIMM, at 0.06 versus 0.10 (Cohen's d = 1.28). The 
mean olig-salience of Voters is much lower in AIMM, at 0.067 versus 0.083 (d = 
0.89). The mean tax rate is also lower in AIMM, at 0.085 versus 0.092 (d = 0.34). 
Olig-salience, tax rate, and donation level are all measures of the size and effi-
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ciency of Oligarch influence, and all indicate lower influence in AIMM. Note that 
similar to IMM and PIMM, in AIMM, Oligarchs adjust their donation levels based 
on the same UPDATE-OLIGARCH-DONATIONS function. This means that Oli-
garchs will decrease their donation levels under two conditions: (1) if their profits 
decreased after an increase in donations, or (2) if profits increased after a de-
crease in donations. This also implies that when Oligarchs in AIMM donate to a 
Party with greater ideo position but lower olig position, they donate "with their 
hearts" – i.e., these donations are ideologically motivated, and are not based on 
their profit motive. If the Party with lower olig position wins, the Oligarchs' profits 
will be lower than if Oligarchs had not donated. Therefore, the likely reason why 
Oligarchs tend to donate less in AIMM is that their donations sometimes reduce 
profits. 
 In AIMM, the conservative Party is ideologically preferred by Oligarchs. 
Our experiments show that the conservative Party tends to adopt a slightly lower 
olig value (i.e., an olig value less preferred by Oligarchs) compared to its rival 
Party. In other words, the Party that Oligarchs naturally favor ideologically tends 
to adopt a tax policy on the olig axis that Voters prefer but Oligarchs do not. The 
mean olig position of the conservative Party in AIMM is lower than in PIMM, at -
43.4 versus -39.7 (Cohen's d = 0.13). This leads to a slightly lower mean olig po-
sition in AIMM compared to PIMM, at -41.4 versus -39.7 (d = 0.12). The effect 
sizes of these trends are very small, but the trends hold consistently across trials. 
It appears that the Party naturally favored by Oligarchs takes advantage of its 
preferred position to court Voters, through a lower olig position. Oligarchs may 
donate to the conservative Party in spite of its lower proposed tax, due to their 
preference for conservative ideo positions. 
 
Summary and Discussion 
 
To summarize, our simulation experiments produced the following find-
ings: 
Result 1. Oligarchs tend to donate less to political campaigns when Parties’ 
proposed policies are inflexible, when Voters are less susceptible to ad-
vertising, or when Voters are strongly opposed to Oligarch interests 
Result 2. When Voters’ awareness of subsidies to Oligarchs is greater, taxes 
on Voters tend to be lower 
Result 3. Greater Oligarch campaign donations produce higher subsidies to 
Oligarchs, but may produce diminishing Oligarch profits if donations are 
too high 
Result 4. If oligarchs choose which party to support based on ideological 
goals instead of expected profits, and adjust their donation levels based 
strictly on subsequent profits, then equilibrium donation levels will be low-
er. 
We discuss these results next. 
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Result 1 can be understood as follows: Under certain conditions (i.e., 
when Parties’ proposed policies are inflexible; when Voters are less susceptible 
to advertising; or, when Voters are strongly opposed to Oligarch interests), Oli-
garchs' marginal benefit from increased donations is lower than usual, while their 
marginal cost is the same as always. Hence, Oligarchs’ marginal cost will equal 
their expected marginal benefit from increased donations at a lower donation lev-
el than usual. Above that donation level, Oligarchs will tend to lose money if they 
increase their donations, so their Hunter strategy will typically cause them to de-
crease their donations in the next cycle after such an increase. This result sup-
ports Brock and Magee (1978) and Bardhan and Mukherjee (2000), who argued 
that Oligarchs can profitably donate money to the campaign of a Party that favors 
their economic interests until the marginal cost of donating more becomes great-
er than the marginal benefit of an increased donation. 
 Result 2 can be understood as follows: When Voters attach high salience 
to the olig policy axis, they are more likely than normal to vote for the Party with 
lower olig position. As a result, Parties can gain votes more reliably by adopting 
low olig positions, so their Hunter strategy will tend to direct Parties toward low 
olig values. The incumbent Party will typically have a low olig value, which pro-
duces lower tax rates. We also found that greater Oligarch campaign donations 
in our model tend to produce higher subsidies, but they can also produce dimin-
ishing Oligarch profits if donation levels become too high (Result 3). These re-
sults support findings by Grossman and Helpman (1996), who suggested that the 
more strongly Voters are opposed to a policy, the more expensive it is to cam-
paign successfully to elect representatives who endorse the policy. According to 
Grossman and Helpman, if a politician has the option to adopt a policy favored by 
potential donors but opposed by voters, the politician will not adopt the policy un-
less the increased campaign donations are enough to bring at least as many 
votes as would be lost in moving to the less popular position. 
 We used the Party-Ideo-Motivated Model to test the effects of giving each 
Party a preferred ideological position, and of making some Voters "loyalists" who 
vote based on ideology and ignore the olig axis. This model produced a better fit 
to Gallup polling data on Democratic and Republican Party support over time 
than the base model (IIM). The PIMM results show reduced impact of donation 
levels on election outcomes, due to the presence of loyalist voters who are unaf-
fected by campaign donations. Otherwise, the results support the conclusions 
drawn from the IIM, though with slightly blunted effect sizes. 
 With the All-Ideo-Motivated Model (AIMM), we analyzed the effect of as-
signing oligarchs an ideological preference, keeping all else the same as the 
PIMM. We discovered a novel result (Result 4), that when oligarchs donate to 
parties based on a combination of ideological and profit motivations, adjusting 
their donation levels based on the resulting profits, oligarchs tend to reach a low-
er equilibrium donation level, because the lost profits under this donation policy 
discourage oligarchs from continuing to make large donations. In future work, we 
envision modeling the likely effect of incumbent party ideology on oligarch profits. 
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It would be interesting to see whether oligarchs would still arrive at a lower equi-
librium level of donations in AIMM, if they adjusted donation levels based partly 
on party ideology, or if incumbent party ideology influenced oligarch profits. 
To conclude, we remind readers of the pragmatic motivation for our work. 
Special interest groups now exert considerable influence on US elections and 
lawmaking through campaign donations and lobbying, particularly since the rise 
of PACs. Pressure groups spend $2 billion annually on lobbying the US federal 
government and $500 million per election cycle in campaign spending (Baum-
gartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball 2009). Recently, interest groups have 
fought successfully against return-free tax filing, direct-to-consumer auto sales, 
and low limits on H-1B visas (Day 2013; Salustri 2014; LaPlante 2007). The 
OLIGO model is a novel agent-based model that captures key features of prior 
theory on special interest campaign donations. Our results suggest that well-
informed voters, uncompromising party leaders, and limited campaign donations 
can reduce the influence of special interest groups in a democracy, and further-
more, under such conditions, the wishes of the median voter may have a greater 
impact on legislative action.  
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Appendix: OLIGO model details 
 
Entities, State Variables, and Scales 
Global parameters of the OLIGO model are included here for completeness, but 
unless otherwise specified, these settings can be changed without substantially 
altering the results of a model run. See Figure A1. The GDP, or total income of all 
agents in the model, is fixed at 1000. 
Oligarchs adjust the fraction of their gross-income that they donate to a 
Party by step size (OLIGARCH-EPSILON) of 0.1, or 10%. Oligarchs collectively 
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earn 0.05 of model GDP (OLIGARCH-GDP-FRACTION), as their total gross-
income. Oligarchs are initialized to donate a random amount, up to 0.3 
(OLIGARCH-INITIAL-DONATION), of their gross-income. Oligarchs will choose 
to increase or decrease their donation-size when they would otherwise do the 
opposite, with probability 0.1 (OLIGARCH-NOISE), to allow them to avoid becom-
ing trapped in suboptimal behaviors. 
Parties adjust their positions along the ideo and olig axes with a step size 
of 5 (PARTY-EPSILON), in the range of -100 (MIN-POS) to 100 (MAX-POS). The 
PARTY-DIFFERENCE-FACTOR affects Oligarchs’ perception of how different 
the Parties are along the olig policy axis. If the Parties are close together along 
the olig axis, Oligarchs will donate less to their favored Party. 
 
Figure A1. Global parameters. 
 
 
Initialization of Oligarchs 
Because Oligarchs’ total gross-income is intended to be a fixed fraction of the 
total gross-income of the population, Oligarchs’ incomes are adjusted by the dif-
ference between their sample mean and the desired mean, in a first moment 
matching procedure. If any Oligarch’s income becomes negative during moment 
matching, all Oligarchs’ gross-income values are drawn again until moment 
matching can be completed (Figure A2). Each Oligarch’s donation-size value is 
set to a random value up to the parameter OLIGARCH-INITIAL-DONATION. 
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Figure A2. Oligarch initialization submodel. 
 
Submodels 
The first submodel enacted in each run step is UPDATE-OLIGARCH-
DONATIONS (Figure A3), in which Oligarchs adjust their donation-size values. 
To prevent Oligarchs from changing their donations in lockstep, an OLIGARCH-
LATENCY parameter of 10 cycles is used, which means that each Oligarch up-
dates its donation-size only every 10 run cycles, and no two Oligarchs will update 
their parameter in the same cycle in a population with fewer than 11 Oligarchs. If 
an Oligarch’s expected profit has increased since 10 cycles earlier, when the Oli-
garch most recently changed its donation-size, the Oligarch will change its dona-
tion-size again in the same direction; otherwise, the Oligarch will change its do-
nation-size in the opposite direction. The Oligarchs’ strategy is based on the 
Hunter behavior proposed by Laver (2005). To allow Oligarchs to explore alterna-
tive strategies, Oligarchs are induced to make a change in the opposite direction 
from what they would do otherwise, with probability OLIGARCH-NOISE. The ac-
tual amount an Oligarch donates to the Party with greater olig value is the Oli-
garch’s donation-size parameter, multiplied by the Oligarch’s gross-income, mul-
tiplied by a scaling factor that increases with the distance between the two Par-
ties’ olig values. See Figure A4 for the calculation of the scaling factor. If the two 
Parties’ olig values are similar, an Oligarch will donate less money to its preferred 
Party, because it can expect less benefit from donating, as suggested by Brock 
and Magee (1978). 
We tested a variation on this model where Oligarchs had a third option, 
the "null action," in which they did not change their donation level from the previ-
ous cycle. Oligarchs would change their donation level only if the reward or pun-
ishment in changed profit of the previous action exceeded a threshold value, oth-
erwise they would keep their donation-size parameter the same. This "null action" 
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model variation led to only a trivial difference in outcomes, as will be shown in the 
results section. 
 
Figure A3. UPDATE-OLIGARCH-DONATIONS submodel. 
 
 
Figure A4. PARTY-OLIG-DIFFERENCE-SCALED function. 
 
 The second submodel to execute in each run cycle is the VOTE submodel 
(Figure A5), in which Voters cast votes for the Party that seems closer to them in 
policy space. The key to this submodel is the VOTER-DISTANCE function (Fig-
ure A6), which determines how far each Party appears to be in policy space from 
a Voter. The VOTER-DISTANCE function measures distance in multiple dimen-
sions by summing the difference between vectors in each dimension, instead of 
by taking the Euclidean distance, because policy positions along each axis are 
not meaningfully related to each other geometrically (Blais, Nadeau, Gidengil, & 
Nevitte 2001). The policy difference along each axis is multiplied by the Voter’s 
salience value for that axis, and the sum of these terms is taken. Finally, the re-
sult is adjusted according to the total donations to the Party’s campaign, such 
that the Party will appear closer if its has received a large amount of campaign 
donations, down to a limit of VOTER-MIN-DISTANCE-SCALE times its “true dis-
tance.” We take VOTER-MIN-DISTANCE-SCALE to be 0.3, following the exam-
ple of Muis (2010), who used a similar procedure to model the effect of advertis-
ing on voter behavior. The marginal effect of campaign donations is modeled as 
decaying exponentially as the level of donations increases (Joseph 2006), and 
we set the rate of decay through the parameter VOTER-AD-DECAY-FACTOR, 
which determines how quickly the effect of greater donations plateaus to the limit-
ing factor, VOTER-MIN-DISTANCE-SCALE. 
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Figure A5. VOTE submodel. 
 
 
Figure A6. VOTER-DISTANCE function. 
 
 The third submodel to execute in each run cycle is REDISTRIBUTE (Fig-
ure A7), in which the new incumbent Party sets the tax rate, and Oligarchs re-
ceive a subsidy based on the amount of tax collected. The tax rate is derived 
from the incumbent Party olig value: It is set such that the fraction of the maxi-
mum allowable tax (0.5) equals the incumbent Party’s fraction of the maximum 
allowable distance from the MIN-POS olig position (-100). All Voters have the 
same gross-income, so they all pay the same tax amount. Each Oligarch has a 
different gross-income, and each receives a share of the total subsidy in direct 
proportion to its fraction of the total gross-income of all the Oligarchs. Oligarchs 
receive subsidies in proportion to their incomes, because subsidies in the OLIGO 
model are meant to simulate the effects of legislation such as tariffs or farm sub-
sidies, which yield greater payoffs to larger businesses. 
 
 
Figure A7. REDISTRIBUTE submodel. 
 
 The fourth submodel of each run cycle is UPDATE-VOTER-OLIG-
SALIENCE (Figure A8). Voters adjust their olig-salience values in this submodel, 
in response to the current tax rate. Voters operate as reflex agents that may or 
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may not recognize that they are paying a redistributive tax. The greater the tax 
rate, the more likely Voters are to receive the message and increase their olig-
salience; this dynamic was suggested by Aidt (2000). We impose a limit on olig-
salience, that it can be no greater than the tax rate. For example, if the current 
tax rate is p in (0, 1), it is arguably not reasonable for a Voter to assign more than 
p salience to the policy dimension that sets the tax rate, because tax rates are 
just one component of Voter utility, so all other components (modeled as the ideo 
dimension) should have a salience of at least 1 – p. Two parameters help to de-
termine a Voter’s new olig-salience value. VOTER-AWARENESS determines 
how likely a Voter will be to increase its olig-salience at a given tax rate. A Voter 
becomes exponentially more likely to increase its olig-salience with a small in-
crease in tax rates, if taxes are low. But if taxes are high, a small increase in tax 
rates will have less marginal effect on a Voter’s likelihood of increasing its olig-
salience. The second parameter is VOTER-MEMORY-STRENGTH, which de-
termines how quickly a Voter “forgets” about past taxes over the course of suc-
cessive run cycles. That is, this parameter determines how quickly the Voter’s 
olig-salience decreases if the Voter does not notice new taxes. Our forgetting 
curve model of Voter behavior is modeled on the work of Aidt (2000). 
 
 
Figure A8. UPDATE-VOTER-OLIG-SALIENCE submodel. 
 
 The last submodel to execute in each run cycle is UPDATE-PARTY-
POLICIES (Figure A9), in which each Party moves to a new position in policy 
space. Each Party follows a Hunter strategy (Laver 2005), which means that it 
will move in the same direction as in the previous cycle if its votes increased, and 
otherwise it will move in a randomly chosen, different direction. Parties change 
their positions along each policy axis by the distance PARTY-EPSILON. 
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Figure A9. UPDATE-PARTY-POLICIES submodel. 
 
